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Jury Consideration of Parole
FERNAND N. DUTILE*
Introduction
Under our system of criminal justice, a jury faces two basic decisions: the de-
termination of guilt and, in many cases, the selection of an appropriate penalty
for the convicted. In both instances the jurors' impressions of the parole system
could be crucial. For example, the jury's notion-correct or incorrect-that the
defendant will be eligible for parole very quickly if sentenced to prison may
cause it to compromise on the issue of guilt. In cases where the jury has discre-
tion in setting the penalty, this notion may seduce it into selecting the death
penalty over life imprisonment.
There are additional problems connected with jury consideration of parole.
Even if it is a desirable jury consideration, it is impossible to anticipate how
parole will affect a particular defendant since the law itself might change and
since the actual granting of parole will rest on post-conviction factors and the
discretion of the parole board. If, on the other hand, it is thought undesirable
for the jury to consider parole, what should be the policy of the law in view of
the fact that many jurors will undoubtedly carry into the trial parole knowledge
obtained independently? The great number of times jurors are informed at trial
of the possibility of parole indicates the importance of the subject.1 This article
proposes to evaluate the attitude of the law towards giving this information to a
jury.2 The discussion will consider the desirability of the jury's being informed
*Assistant Professor of Law, Catholic University of America School of Law. A.B.,
Assumption College, 1962; J.D., Notre Dame, 1965; Civil Rights Division, Justice De-
partment, 1965-66; Member of the Maine Bar.
1. The problem is by no means a new one. See Seymour v. Commonwealth, 220 Ky.
348, 295 S.W. 142 (1927) where, even at that early date, the Court of Appeals of Ken-
tucky referred to "the long line of cases" in which it considered (and condemned) pro-
secutorial reference to the possibility of parole. See also Jacobs v. State, 103 Miss. 622,
60 So. 723 (1913).
2. Other types of information which might be made available to the jury raise similar
considerations. See, e.g., Boyle v. State, 229 Ala. 212, 154 So. 575 (1934) (possibility of
release from mental asylum) ; Jones v. State, 161 Ark. 242, 255 S.W. 876 (1923) (possi-
bility of industrial school sentence) ; People v. Linden, 52 Cal. 2d 1, 338 P.2d 397, cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 867 (1959) (possibility of pardon) ; Biggers v. State, 171 Ga. 596, 156
S.E. 201 (1930) (possibility of escape); People v. Burgard, 377 Ill. 322, 36 N.E.2d 558
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about the parole possibility, the role of the harmless error rule, and the relation-
ship that the source and the context of the informing have to the problem.
The Desirability of Jury Knowledge of Parole Operation
The nature of parole is important to the inquiry. It has been defined as the
"conditional release of a selected convicted person before completion of the term
of imprisonment to which he has been sentenced."' 3 Parole provides a method for
the supervision of the prisoner's transition into society and, therefore, is not
merely an expression of "leniency or forgiveness."'4 As the Task Force on Cor-
rections of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration
of Justice reported, "prisoners serve as much time in confinement in jurisdic-
tions where parole is widely used as in those where it is not."' 5 There is no
guarantee that a prisoner will actually be granted parole since many factors-
the prisoner's history, danger to the community, rehabilitation, skills, etc.-enter
into the parole decision. The source and extent of parole authority varies. "[It]
may depend on statutes enacted by the legislature, on the sentence imposed by
the court, or on the determination of correctional authorities or an independent
parole board. For certain offenses some statutes require that various amounts of
time must be served before parole can be considered, or they prohibit parole
entirely."'6
Speculation on Parole Operation
By the weight of authority, informing the jury of parole possibility is improper,7
but appellate courts which have deemed such information proper have argued
that since parole provisions might have a drastic effect on the sentence, the jury
must be made aware of them.8 It is further argued that in any case tried without
(1941) (possibility of probation) ; Bryant v. State, 205 Ind. 372, 186 N.E. 322 (1933)
(possibility of suspended sentence); State v. Clark, 196 Iowa 1134, 196 N.W. 82 (1923)
(possibility of stay of execution) ; State v. Kiefer, 16 S.D. 180, 91 N.W. 1117 (1902)
(invariable rule of the court to follow jury recommendation of mercy) ; State v. Clark,
227 Ore. 391, 362 P.2d 335 (1961) (right to appeal); Coward v. Commonwealth, 164
Va. 639, 178 S.E. 797 (1935) (possibility of time off for good behavior).
3. Parole and After-Care, (ST/SOA/SD/4) (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 1954. IV. 16), p. 1,
quoted in M. PAULSEN & S. KADISH, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 198 (1962).
4. Ibid.
5. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 62 (1967).
6. Ibid.
7. Shoemaker v. State, 228 Md. 462, 180 A.2d 682 (1962) ; State v. White, 27 N.J.
158, 142 A.2d 65 (1958); Note, The Nature and Consequences of Forensic Misconduct
in the Prosecution of a Criminal Case, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 946, 957 (1954).
8. See, e.g., Mallory v. United States, 236 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1956), rev'd on other
grounds, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); People v. Linden, 52 Cal. 2d 1, 338 P.2d 397, cert.
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a jury the trial judge becomes the finder of fact, and he is very likely to be aware
of the specifics of the parole law.9 This reasoning at first blush is compelling;
parole affects the sentence and, in order to make an intelligent judgment, the
jury should be aware of the effect parole might have on the accused. A closer
analysis, however, discloses serious defects in this logic. First, the parole law
may not be the same by the time the defendant becomes eligible for parole. In
Broyles v. Commonwealth10 the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed a murder
conviction because the prosecutor had explained to the jury what the period of
time after which the defendant would become eligible for parole would be with
respect to each possible sentence. "Although the attorney's explanation of the
parole law in this case seems to be correct," the court said, "the law might be
radically different by the time the defendant would be eligible for parole."' " The
possibility is that the sentence might be set with an eye to a parole law more
lenient or more severe than the one actually in force at the time of the defend-
ant's eligibility. In considering parole, then, the jury speculates on the future
action of the legislature.
Jury consideration of parole also involves speculation concerning the actions
of the defendant and of the parole board. The judiciary has no more control
over these factors than it does over prospective legislation. This was recognized
by the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. White. 12 Reversing a first degree
murder conviction on the ground that the jury had been informed of the parole
law, the court noted that the legislature had provided only two possible pen-
alties-death or life imprisonment subject to parole. An immutable life sentence
had not been enacted because the legislature "believed it to be beyond the talent
of any one to anticipate whether future circumstances will warrant amelioration
of the life sentence." 13 Although the defendant may be entitled to parole con-
sideration at a time certain, it is impossible for the jury to know with any cer-
tainty whether the defendant will in fact be released on parole. While punish-
ment is meted out in the defendant's sentence "on the basis of his acts and con-
denied, 361 U.S. 867 (1959) ; People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 305 P.2d 1 (1956), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 930 (1957), appeal dismissed, 358 U.S. 646 (1959); People v. Reese,
47 Cal. 2d 112, 301 P.2d 582 (1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 929 (1958) ; Watts v. State,
226 Ind. 655, 82 N.E.2d 846 (1948), rev'd on other grounds, 338 U.S. 49 (1949);
State v. Rombolo, 89 N.J.L. 565, 99 A. 434 (1916) ; State v. Meyer, 163 Ohio St. 279,
126 N.E.2d 585 (1955).
9. See Jones v. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 273, 281, 72 S.E.2d 693, 697 (1952) (con-
curring opinion).
10. 267 S.W.2d 73 (Ky. 1954).
11. Id. at 76; See also People v. Treloar, 61 Cal. 2d 544, 393 P.2d. 698, 39 Cal. Rptr.
386 (1964).
12. 27 N.J. 158, 142 A.2d 65 (1958).
13. Id. at 178, 142 A.2d at 76. See also People v. Morse, 60 Cal. 2d 631, 388 P.2d
33, 36 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1964).
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duct prior to trial ...parole is determined mainly on the basis of subsequent
acts and demeanor."' 14 Even if the jury could reasonably expect the defendant's
post-conviction conduct to be perfect in every way, it would still be speculating
as far as parole eventualities are concerned because of the wide discretion
vested in the parole board. Because "a prisoner has no absolute right to be
released upon parole where he has a clean conduct record while in prison and
has served the minimum term for his offense,"' 5 a reasonably certain prediction
of parole vis-A-vis a particular defendant is impossible, and consideration of
the parole factor by the jury amounts to "conjecture"' 6 and "mere guesswork."' 7
It has been argued that it is permissible for the jury to "estimate" when the
defendant will be released on parole so long as the jury is aware that the parole
process is not automatic. In Grandsinger v. State,18 the prosecutor referred to
the defendant's right to seek a hearing before the Nebraska Board of Pardons
and Parole. The court, in refusing to deem the reference reversible error,19 noted
that the prosecutor had merely set out the applicable law without indicating how
difficult parole was to secure or whether it could be secured by the defend-
ant at all. In line with this reasoning, courts have emphasized that informing
the jury of parole is permissible so long as there is no assertion concerning the
actual time parole would occur,20 the actual policy of the parole board, 21 or
other specifics of parole operation. 22
Usurpation of the Functions of Other Branches of Government
Even if the future operation of parole could be accurately predicted, any con-
sideration of that operation usurps the functions of other branches of govern-
ment. 23 The parole law was intended to affect sentences as they are in good faith
14. State v. Conner, 241 N.C. 468, 469, 85 S.E.2d 584, 586 (1955).
15. Graham v. State, 202 Tenn. 423, 426, 304 S.W.2d 622, 623 (1957).
16. McLendon v. State, 205 Ga. 55, 65, 52 S.E.2d 294, 300 (1949).
17. Graham v. State, 202 Tenn. 423, 427, 304 S.W.2d 622, 624 (1957).
18. 161 Neb. 419, 73 N.W.2d 632 (1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 880 (1956).
19. But see Coward v. Commonwealth, 164 Va. 639, 178 S.E. 797 (1935).
20. People v. Ashley, 59 Cal. 2d 339, 379 P.2d 496, 29 Cal. Rptr. 16, cert. denied, 374
U.S. 819 (1963).
21. French v. State, 397 P.2d 909 (Okla. Crim. 1964).
22. Bean v. State, 81 Nev. 25, 398 P.2d 251 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1012
(1966); Martin v. State, 400 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. Crim.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 961
(1966).
23. A closing argument is objectionable if it involves (1) inflammatory statements,
(2) improper reference (i.e., reference to a statement of fact-other than a matter of
common knowledge-for which no evidence was introduced), or (3) improper issues
(e.g., the wisdom of legislation). 47 IoWA L. REV. 1131, 1132 (1962). It can be argued
that a parole reference by the prosecutor does concern the wisdom of legislation and is
therefore objectionable. Furthermore, if the prosecutor informs the jury of actual cases
in which prisoners were released on parole, that phase of the argument would involve an
improper reference to a fact not in evidence. See Estepp v. Commonwealth, 185 Ky. 156,
214 S.W. 891 (1919); Augustine v. State, 201 Miss. 277, 28 So. 2d 243 (1946).
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set by judges or jurors. If at the trial stage sentences are prescribed with a view
toward offsetting the operation of parole, the judicial branch has in effect
thwarted the legislative intent and usurped executive discretion.24 In Pena v.
State25 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found such usurpation reversible
error. The defendant was convicted of murder after the prosecutor had argued
the parole law to the jury. At the hearing on the motion for a new trial it was
shown that the jury during its deliberations had in fact discussed the prosecu-
tor's parole argument. The court concluded, "[t]he parole law is not to be
applied by the trial court, but is to be exercised by the board of pardons ex-
clusively when facts are presented which would authorize them to exercise their
power ... ."26 Where a prosecutor argues the leniency of the parole system he, in
effect, urges the jury to legislate according to that prosecutor's own view of pa-
role. 27 Yet "[e]quality under the law is not to be attained by permitting the
prosecuting attorney to prevail upon the jury to forego what may be an other-
wise satisfactory course of action in order to preclude the future application of
that which he considers bad parole law administered by irresponsible officials."' 28
Absent any constitutional question, the proper role of the judicial branch is
to presume the wisdom of the parole law. If the law is unwise, the appropriate
corrective is legislative amendment or repeal, not the neutralization of the law
by the jury. This usurpation is particularly egregious in those cases where the
jury has the power to choose between life imprisonment and capital punish-
ment or to recommend one or the other to the court. If the jury is informed of
the parole possibility by the court or by the prosecutor, there is a serious danger
that the defendant may be sentenced to death-where otherwise he might have
been sentenced to life imprisonment-because the jury anticipated the parole
system. If this occurs, the net result of the parole system-which has as at least
one of its objectives the benefit of the convicted person-is to execute a person
deserving no more than life imprisonment. "It is no more proper for a jury to
conclude that death be the penalty because ... the defendant [may be] pa-
roled, than it would be for a trial judge in other criminal causes deliberately to
impose an excessive sentence to frustrate the statutory scheme committing parole
24. See People v. Morse, 60 Cal. 2d 631, 388 P.2d 33. 36 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1964) ; com-
pare Broyles v. Commonwealth, 267 S.W.2d 73 (Ky. 1954) with Houston v. Common-
wealth, 270 Ky. 125, 109 S.W.2d 45 (1937), where the trial court's negative answer to
a jury inquiry as to whether a life sentence precluded pardon was held reversible error
on the ground that the question involved a coordinate branch of government.
25. 137 Tex. Crim. 311, 129 S.W.2d 667 (1939).
26. Id. at 314, 129 S.W.2d at 669.
27. See State v. Johnson, 151 La. 625, 92 So. 139 (1922).
28. 28 N.C.L., REv. 342, 345 (1950). See also Jones v. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 273,
279, 72 S.E.2d 693, 696 (1952), where the court stated that the jury "should not fix a
defendant's punishment with the view of preventing the operation of laws that have been
duly enacted for the handling of a prisoner after sentence in a way considered by the
lawmakers to be in the best interests of the public and the prisoner."
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to another agency.... That death should be inflicted when a life sentence is
appropriate is an abhorrent thought." 29 In capital cases, therefore, very few
jurisdictions allow the prosecution to urge the death penalty in order to prevent
the defendant's possible release on parole.30
The Relevance of Parole Law to the Case
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has
said that a trial court could properly inform the jury of the parole law because
such informing was part of the law of the case which it has a right to consider. 3 1
That argument assumes, however, that the parole law is relevant and appropri-
ate to the case-not merely that it is the law. It is not appropriate for a jury to
consider the mechanics of parole-no more appropriate than to consider the
law governing the maintenance of the prison in which the defendant might
serve any term imposed. Thus, when the state's counsel in Graham v. State32
urged that arguing parole to the jury was not error because it is proper for the
prosecutor to argue the law of the case, the court responded that "the fallacy of
this argument is that the parole law is not the law of the case, or any part of
it.1,33
Relevance of Parole to the Penalty-Setting Function
The substance of the argument in support of informing the jury of parole pro-
visions is that they are relevant to the penalty the defendant should receive. This
reasoning is not persuasive in those cases in which the jury has no function in
determining or recommending punishment,34 and courts have justifiably been
reluctant to allow parole provision information in such cases-particularly in
the form of a prosecutorial argument. 35 In Shoemaker v. State,3 6 the prosecutor
29. State v. White, 27 N.J. 158, 177-78, 142 A.2d 65, 76 (1958).
30. See Note, supra note 7.
31. Mallory v. United States, 236 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1956), rev'd on other grounds,
354 U.S. 449 (1957). See Phillips v. State, 92 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 1957), where the Su-
preme Court of Florida approved the trial court's informing the jury, at the request of
the foreman, of the parole provisions on the ground that a Florida statute (now FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 918.10 (Supp. 1969)) directs the trial court to charge on the penalty as
well as on the law.
32. 202 Tenn. 423, 304 S.W.2d 622 (1957).
33. Id. at 426, 304 S.W.2d at 623. See also Bland v. State, 211 Ga. 178, 183, 84 S.E.
2d 369, 372 (1954) (dissenting opinion), where it is argued that the regulation book of
the parole board is not law and cannot be judicially noticed.
34. Rowe v. State, 237 N.E.2d 576 (Ind. 1968). See People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566,
305 P.2d 1 (1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 930 (1957), appeal dismissed, 358 U.S. 646
(1959).
35. Rowe v. State, 237 N.E.2d 576 (Ind. 1968).
36. 228 Md. 462, 180 A.2d 682 (1962).
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made reference to parole possibilities where the penalty was in fact, if not in
theory, out of their hands. The Maryland Court of Appeals concluded, "[tihe
chief vice of the reference in this case to the possibility of parole is that it sug-
gested to the jury that it might in part shift its responsibility for a finding of
the defendant's guilt to some other body."3 7 The danger is that jurors might re-
solve a close question of guilt against the defendant and allay their consciences
by relying upon the parole board's future decisions with reference to the defend-
ant. In Commonwealth v. Mills38 the jury, during its deliberations, asked the
judge to define life imprisonment and to inform them whether the defendant
would be eligible for parole at any time under a life sentence. The judge an-
swered the inquiries and the jury found the defendant guilty. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed, holding, inter alia, that since the
only issue before the jury was the guilt of the defendant rather than his punish-
ment, the judge's answer tended to lead the jury to believe that if it unjustifiably
settled a doubtful issue against the defendant a parole board would vitiate the
error.
It is interesting to note the different role the parole concept might play when
the jury has a function in setting the penalty. Where the jury has a say as to the
punishment, the principal danger is that it will anticipate the action of the pa-
role board and attempt to offset it by a larger prison sentence or, in extreme
cases, the death penalty. 39 Furthermore, in most cases where the jury sets the
penalty, it also determines the guilt issue.40 In a murder case where the jury has
discretion to recommend life imprisonment or the death penalty, if the evidence
is overwhelming and the crime a shocking one, the fear of parole may play a
role in determining the penalty; if the evidence is comparatively weak or the
defendant's situation relatively sympathetic, reliance on the parole board may
play a role in determining guilt. In this latter circumstance the jury is likely to
be concerned with the choice between life imprisonment (for murder) and some
other penalty (for a lesser included offense) or even acquittal. Therefore, what-
ever objections can be voiced against informing the jury about the parole law
37. Id. at 469, 180 A.2d at 685.
38. 350 Pa. 478, 39 A.2d 572 (1944).
39. See Note, Statements by Prosecuting Attorneys to Juries Which Demand Im-
proper Considerations for Verdict or Punishment, 39 VA. L. REv. 85, 92 (1953).
40. Nevertheless, a bifurcated trial arrangement does not solve the basic problem pre-
sented by a jury's parole knowledge, even if that jury deals only with the penalty. The
Supreme Court of California initially held that it was not error in the penalty phase of the
case for the jury to be informed in detail of the defendant's parole possibilities. People v.
Turville, 51 Cal. 2d 620, 335 P.2d 678, cert. denied, 360 U.S. 939 (1959); People v.
Ward, 50 Cal. 2d 702, 328 P.2d 777 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 945 (1949).
Due to abuses resulting from this policy, however, the court, in People v. Morse, 60
Cal. 2d 631, 388 P.2d 33, 36 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1964), halted the flow of parole
information to the jury by prohibiting speculation as to when the defendant may be
released.
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where the jury determines guilt alone are equally present where the jury has
influence over the penalty.4 1
"Neutral' Informing and Informing on Jurors' Inquiry
An important distinction can be drawn between parole information given the
jury by the judge and that given the jury by the prosecution. 42 A trial judge's
instructions to the jury about parole are given with no attempt to persuade the
jury of what it should do in light of that information, 43 and his language will
tend to be neutral in tone when compared to that of the prosecutor. It is not al-
together certain, however, that it will have any less influence. A jury is more
likely to rely on the trial judge than on the prosecutor, for it knows that the
prosecutor, although representing society in general, is partisan. When the
judge informs the jury that, due to parole, the defendant may not serve his
whole prison term, he is inherently persuasive; the jury might over-react to the
judge's information and attempt to offset the effect of parole by imposing a
greater penalty. 44
The issue becomes more difficult in those cases where the jury returns from its
deliberations and inquires as to parole possibility. In such cases, whether or not
the judge answers the question, the parole concept is obviously on the minds of
the jurors and will continue to play a role until a verdict is reached. 45 In State
v. Nelson46 the jury inquired of the court whether the defendant would actually
spend his life in prison if given a life sentence. In answer, the judge read the
state's constitutional provisions concerning parole and pardon. The defendant
was found guilty of murder and sentenced to death. Emphasizing that the trial
court had not indicated in its answer which sentence the jury should choose, the
New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed, stating: "The fact that the jury, of its
own volition, directed the inquiry to the court indicates that one or more of the
jurors had some knowledge of the laws relative to pardon and parole. Such be-
41. See 15 STAN. L. REV. 349, 351-52 (1963). Juries rather than judges set sentences
in ten states. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 145 (1967).
42. See 20 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 168, 170 (1963).
43. See Nelson v. Cox, 66 N.M. 397, 349 P.2d 118 (1960).
44. See Bland v. State, 211 Ga. 178, 181, 84 S.E.2d 369, 372 (1954) (concurring
opinion), where it is argued that remarks from the prosecutor are mere argument while
those from the judge are "solemn" law. In McGruder v. State, 213 Ga. 259, 98 S.E.2d
564 (1957), the Supreme Court of Georgia refused to find any significant difference
between instruction on parole by the judge and argument on parole from the prosecutor,
holding that the former is prohibited under the state statute (now GA. CODE ANN. § 27-
2206 (Supp. 1967)) prohibiting attorneys from arguing parole to the jury. The court
reasoned that this statute established a policy that juries are not to be influenced by pa-
role considerations.
45. See 20 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 168, 170 (1963).
46. 65 N.M. 403, 338 P.2d 301, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 877 (1959).
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ing the case, a refusal to answer would not dispell [sic] erroneous notions im-
planted by a juror with a 'little learning' on the subject, and in all probability
would leave the jury in confusion and doubt. ' ' 47 The argument is that jurors'
questions should be answered 48 and that, if they are not, jurors will resort to
whatever information they might have concerning the parole law. If, for ex-
ample, one juror has the false impression that prisoners are let out on parole
almost immediately, and no other juror has any information to refute it, the
jury will in effect be deciding the case just as if state law were as represented
by the "informed" juror. In such a case, the defendant is likely to receive
harsher treatment than he deserved, harsher even than if the court had an-
swered the inquiry. Furthermore, a refusal by the judge to answer a question
which the jury deems relevant to its mission is likely to create or strengthen an
impression that somehow parole is a sinister concept unjustifiably calculated
to free criminals despite the wishes of the jury. Thus, even one who argues
generally that jurors should not be informed of parole provisions could, with-
out inconsistency, favor so informing the jury upon its inquiry. The fact that
parole information was given to the jury following its inquiry, however, has
not prevented courts from concluding that such informing was improper.
49
Parole Information and the Harmless Error Rule
An appellate court can reach one of three decisions when reviewing a case
where parole information has been made available to the jury: (1) it can find
the informing proper; 50 (2) it may deem the informing improper but, under the
circumstances, not prejudicial error; 5' or (3) it might find the informing not
only improper but prejudicial, and therefore reversible.5 2 The latter two deci-
47. Id. at 409, 338 P.2d at 305. See also Glover v. State, 211 Ark. 1002, 204 S.W.2d
373 (1947).
48. See State v. Carroll, 52 Wyo. 29, 86, 69 P.2d 542, 564 (1937). The dissent argued
that while the inquiry should have been answered, the trial court should have directed
the jury to "return the verdict that would carry the punishment they thought the de-
fendant should suffer," without speculating upon "what might happen after the verdict."
49. See, e.g., McCray v. State, 261 Ala. 275, 74 So. 2d 491 (1954) ; State v. White, 27
N.J. 158, 142 A.2d 65 (1958); McKuhen v. State, 216 Ga. 172, 115 S.E.2d 330 (1960).
50. See, e.g., Mallory v. United States, 236 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1956), rev'd on other
grounds, 354 U.S. 449 (1957) ; State v. Jackson, 100 Ariz. 91, 412 P.2d 36, cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 877 (1966) ; State v. Jordan, 80 Ariz. 193, 294 P.2d 677 (1956) ; Peo-
ple v. Ketchel, 59 Cal. 2d 503, 381 P.2d 394, 30 Cal. Rptr. 538 (1963) ; Phillips v. State,
92 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 1957); Bean v. State, 81 Nev. 25, 398 P.2d 251 (1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 1012 (1966); State v. Nelson, 65 N.M. 403, 338 P.2d 301 (1959);
State v. Meyer, 163 Ohio St. 279, 126 N.E.2d 585 (1955) ; Martin v. State, 400 S.W.2d
919 (Tex. Crim.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 961 (1966).
51. See, e.g., Singer v. State, 109 So. 2d 7(Fla. 1959).
52. See, e.g., McCray v. State, 261 Ala. 275, 74 So. 2d 491 (1954); People v. Hillery,
62 Cal. 2d 692, 401 P.2d 382, 44 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1965), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 938
(1967); McKuhen v. State, 216 Ga. 172, 115 S.E.2d 330 (1960); Rowe v. State, 237
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sions result from the operation of the so-called "harmless error" rule, adopted
in most jurisdictions by constitutional amendment, statute or judicial decision. 53
This rule precludes the reversal of a conviction for error committed at trial un-
less the error was prejudicial. That the harmless error rule plays a very impor-
tant role in parole-informing cases5 4 is evidenced by the large number of cases
where an appellate court has refused to reverse because some aspect of the trial,
while error, was not "clearly prejudicial"55 or "substantially prejudicial," 56
or because there was no "reasonable probability"57 that the result would have
been different without the error.
The harmless error rule serves a reputable purpose in preventing retrials
due to trivial errors. No complex trial can be held without some mistakes oc-
curring. Many of these errors are extremely technical and could not have pre-
judiced the defendant, and it is properly felt that such errors should not
invalidate the trial. Nonetheless, the application of the harmless error rule to
cases involving parole information raises serious questions.
The particular wording of the harmless error rule and the attitude of the court
in applying it are especially important. In Tate v. Commonwealth,58 the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals found the prosecutor's parole argument improper but
refused to reverse "unless other circumstances in the case clearly established the
fact that is was substantially prejudicial to defendant's rights . . . ." (Emphasis
added.) 5 9 Such a formula places the burden of showing prejudice on the de-
fendant, though the very nature of the harmless error concept demands reversal
except where it is clear that the error did not adversely affect the defendant. The
Tate application allows serious questions of prejudice to be resolved against the
defendant, and the harmless error rule becomes a harmful error rule.
Applicability of the Rule
The subject matter of the error may be such as to make the harmless error rule
inapplicable. There are errors which by their very nature are so prejudicial that
N.E.2d 576 (Ind. 1968) ; Broyles v. Commonwealth, 267 S.W.2d 73 (Ky. 1954) ; Shoe-
maker v. State, 228 Md. 462, 180 A.2d 682 (1962) ; State v. Cornett, 381 S.W.2d 878
(Mo. 1964); State v. Conner, 241 N.C. 468, 85 S.E.2d 584 (1955); French v. State, 397
P.2d 909 (Okla. Crim. 1964); Commonwealth v. Aljoe, 420 Pa. 198, 216 A.2d 50
(1966); Williams v. State, 191 Tenn. 456, 234 S.W. 2d 993 (1950); see also State v.
Hinton, 210 S.C. 480, 43 S.E.2d 360 (1947).
53. See Note, Prosecutor Forensic Misconduct--"Harmless Error"? 6 UTAH L.
REV.. 108, 115 (1958) ; 20 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 168, 172 (1963).
54. See 20 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 168, 170 (1963) ; Note, supra note 39, at 86.
55. State v. Shawen, 40 W. Va. 1, 20 S.E. 873 (1894).
56. Tate v. Commonwealth, 258 Ky. 685, 80 S.W.2d 817 (1935).
57. State v. Junkins, 147 Iowa 588, 126 N.W. 689 (1910).
58. 258 Ky. 685, 80 S.W.2d 817 (1935).
59. Id. at 694, 80 S.W.2d at 821.
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a court can never be justified in holding them harmless, even though there is no
concrete indication that actual prejudice occurred. To inquire whether the de-
fendant was harmed overlooks the fact that an error occurred which might well
have infected the trial despite the absence of any manifestation of prejudice.
The more serious the subject matter, the more it becomes necessary to remove
the burden of showing harmful prejudice from the defendant. Where consti-
tutional errors are concerned, for example, the United States Supreme Court
has held that a state's harmless error rule is not the test for reversibility; in such
cases the federal test, harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, applies. 60 When pa-
role is argued to a jury by the prosecutor or explained to it by the judge, appel-
late courts could justifiably deem this so improper as to be prejudicial as a
matter of law. In Sukle v. People6' the Supreme Court of Colorado reversed a
death penalty conviction where the judge had indicated to the jury, in response
to its inquiry, that a life sentence could be shortened by parole. The court noted
that "[p]rejudicial error is obvious." 62 The argument that parole information
may be inherently prejudicial is especially strong where such information is
given to a jury charged with choosing between life imprisonment and a death
sentence.
63
The harmless error rule presents a further difficulty if the prosecutor argues
parole to a jury in a jurisdiction which considers such informing improper. The
parole information supplied by the prosecutor is likely to come during his sum-
mation to the jury. During the presentation of evidence, a complicated system of
rules governs what is to be admitted. There are, however, no such tight controls
over the closing arguments. 64 It is here that the prosecutor has the greatest free-
dom and may argue the parole consideration, realizing that he is unlikely to be
interrupted by an objection. 65 This freedom may encourage the prosecutor to en-
gage in the improper conduct since he realizes that the appellate court will
probably utilize the harmless error rule to overlook the misconduct. The prosecu-
tor may intentionally resort to this misconduct due to the political nature of his
office or his spirit of advocacy; he may be reacting to similar tactics by the de-
fense attorney, or seeking to overcome the favorable position afforded the
defendant by law.66 Whatever the reasons, courts should be ever alert to the
60. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
61. 107 Colo. 269, 111 P.2d 233 (1941).
62. Id. at 273, 111 P.2d at 235.
63. State v. White, 27 N.J. 158, 142 A.2d 65 (1958).
64. See Levin & Levy, Persuading the Jury with Facts not in Evidence: The Fiction-
Science Spectrum, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 139, 140 (1956).
65. Harris v. United States, 402 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1968) : "Counsel may, of course,
object during the argument, but unless the departure from the proprieties is egregious
neither the court nor the jury is likely to look favorably upon such an interruption at
that stage."
66. See Note, supra note 53, at 111.
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possibility that the prosecutor may not be as detached and as fair an enforcer of
the law as he should be.
Although courts have been reluctant to admit it, a liberal use of the harmless
error rule may promote forensic misconduct. The important factor in dealing
with forensic misconduct is not whether the appellate court terms it improper
but whether the judgment is reversed. 67 The Kentucky experience is revealing.
In 1927, in Seymour v. Commonwealth,68 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky,
referring to a prosecutor's argument that people sentenced to life imprisonment
are released and kill again, stated:
We are surprised that the commonwealth's attorney indulged in this
argument, since in a long line of cases we have unhesitatingly con-
demned like arguments .... The very fact that we are called on so
many times to discuss this question .. . induce [sic] the belief that
many of the commonwealth's attorneys are not heeding as they should
our ruling in this matter. We are loathe to believe that such action on
their part is encouraged because these arguments, although con-
demned, have under the particular facts in the cases involved been
held by us not so prejudicial as to warrant a reversal. 69 (Emphasis
added.)
In 1935, the same court found improper a parole argument, but refused to
reverse. 70 It did, however, "again admonish prosecuting counsel throughout the
commonwealth not to indulge in such statements .. ."71 (Emphasis added.) In
Broyles v. Commonwealth,72 decided in 1954, the court was called upon to re-
view a murder conviction carrying life imprisonment. During his argument to
the jury, the prosecutor had indicated the precise point at which the defendant
would become eligible for parole under each of the possible sentences. The ap-
pellate court's patience had finally run out. It reversed the conviction on the
sole ground of the parole argument: "since for the past 30 years we have been
condemning arguments less pernicious than this, we cannot in good conscience
continue to overlook the error. ' 73
Mandatory reversal for certain kinds of misconduct, through legislative
amendment or judicial interpretation, is the appropriate remedy for the bulk of
the cases. Mr. Justice Fortas, dissenting from the denial of a writ of certiorari in
a case involving prosecutorial misbehavior, stated, "it is by no means clear that
petitioner must show that the prosecutor's knowing acquiescence in a material
67. Id. at 115.
68. 220 Ky. 348, 295 S.W. 142 (1927).
69. Id. at 353-54, 295 S.W. at 145.
70. Tate v. Commonwealth, 258 Ky. 685, 80 S.W.2d 817 (1935).
71. Id. at 694, 80 S.W.2d at 821.
72. 267 S.W.2d 73 (Ky. 1954).
73. Id. at 76.
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falsehood prejudiced him. There is no place in our system of criminal justice
for prosecutiorial misconduct. '74 Where misconduct of the prosecutor is con-
cerned, then, the harmless error rule should be irrelevant. Certainly such cases
call for a restricted application of the rule. 75 The argument that the expense of
new trials "weighs strongly against the use of reversal as a means of disciplining
prosecutors" 76 fails to recognize that expense in such a matter must be a sub-
ordinate consideration. Furthermore, very few reversals in a given jurisdiction
would be required before this particular kind of misconduct would stop. The
parole argument seems an especially apt candidate for the "reversal cure" since
it is clearly definable. The line between arguing and not arguing parole is clear
and, unlike in other areas of forensic misconduct, there is little danger that a
prosecutor will accidentally slide into it, even in the heat of battle.
To instill a fear of reversal is not the only remedy, nor is it foolproof. In a
sensational case, the prosecutor, recognizing that the public pays closer attention
to the trial than to the appeal, may be prepared to pay the price of later reversal
for a "present, conspicuous victory."' 77 The trial judge, however, is in a good
position to reprimand and to correct the misconduct, especially since he has so
much discretion over the opening and closing statements and need not await a
defense objection before intervening.78 Such intervention might include disci-
plining the offender, 79 declaring a mistrial, or granting a new trial. In especially
serious situations, or where the misconduct is repetitious, the trial judge should
resort to his contempt power ° or to the professional penalties of disbarment,
suspension or reprimand.81 As a practical matter, measures such as removal
from office or the imposition of civil liability offer little hope.82 The harmless
error rule restrains effective attempts by appellate courts to deal with misconduct
which, even though not fatal to this appellant, jeopardizes the integrity of the
system.8 3 Appellate courts should acknowledge that overseeing the fairness of an
individual trial is not their only function; they must also show concern for the
preservation of appropriate trial court standards. 84 Even if such an objective is
74. Nash v. Illinois, 389 U.S. 906 (1967).
75. For an example of a restricted application of the harmless error rule in a case
involving prosecutorial misconduct (arguing from facts not in evidence), see McCall
v. State, 120 Fla. 707, 163 So. 38 (1935).
76. Note, The Nature and Consequences of Forensic Misconduct in the Prosecution
of a Criminal Case, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 946, 978 (1954).
77. Cain, Sensationcl Prosecutions and Reversals, 7 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1, 41 (1931).
78. Note, supra note 53, at 112; Goff v. Commonwealth, 241 Ky. 428, 432, 44 S.W.2d
306, 309 (1931).
79. See Seymour v. Commonwealth, 220 Ky. 348, 295 S.W. 142 (1927).
80. See 60 W. VA. L. REV. 375, 378 (1958).
81. Cf. Note, The Imposition of Disciplinary Measures for the Misconduct of At-
torneys, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 1039 (1952).
82. See Note, supra note 76, at 979.
83. Id. at 959.
84. Note, supra note 53, at 117.
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not legislatively expressed, surely the application of the rule reflects the extent to
which prosecutorial misconduct taints the criminal process.85
The Source and Context of the Informing
Where the judge has informed the jury of parole provisions, some courts have
deemed it relevant to inquire whether countervailing considerations were also
furnished to the jury. In State v. White,8 6 for example, the New Jersey Supreme
Court reversed a murder conviction carrying a death sentence on the ground
that the judge, upon inquiry by the jury, had instructed it concerning parole
provisions. The court emphasized that the trial judge had not read a certain
part of the law limiting parole and had not disclosed that a parolee could be
returned to prison for parole violation. In Jones v. Commonwealth,87 the jury
asked the court if there was any assurance that the defendant would not be
released if they affixed his punishment at life imprisonment or a long term of
years. The trial judge, while not setting out the specifics of the parole law,
answered that no such assurance could be given since any release would be an
executive decision. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding
it improper to so instruct the jury without informing them that under Virginia
law persons sentenced to life imprisonment were not eligible for parole. In each
of these cases, it was the trial judge who had informed the jury of the parole
possibilities. The appellate courts recognized that the mere statement of such
possibility carries with it, albeit unintended, at least some degree of persuasion,
and that any such information ought to be balanced by instruction concerning
aspects of the law tending to offset that persuasion. Instruction should include
such factors as parole ineligibility for certain verdicts or sentences open to the
jury, any restrictive criteria used by the parole board before release, factors in
the case which make parole highly unlikely or difficult,8 8 and the conditions to
85. 60 W. VA. L. REV. 375, 377 (1958). See Note, supra note 76, at 971, for the sug-
gestion that affirming a conviction under the harmless error rule despite the prosecutor's
improper remark (1) assumes that the jury disregarded the remark and (2) presupposes
that the defendant is not entitled to a fair trial if he can otherwise be shown guilty.
86. 27 N.J. 158, 142 A.2d 65 (1958).
87. 194 Va. 273, 72 S.E.2d 693 (1952).
88. Not every aspect of a particular defendant's parole chances may be brought be-
fore the jury since items such as past convictions, which would play a role in the pa-
role process, may be inadmissible at trial.
In an analogous situation, in People v. Linden, 52 Cal. 2d 1, 338 P.2d 397, cert. de-
nied, 361 U.S. 867 (1959), the prosecutor argued to the jury that if given life imprison-
ment rather than death the defendant would be pardoned by the governor. On appeal of
his death penalty conviction, the appellant claimed that the prosecutor should have
added that the governor could not grant a pardon to one twice-convicted of a felony
except upon the recommendation of a majority of the state supreme court. The court
rejected this argument, refusing to attach any significance to the particulars of
executive clemency. Id. at 25, 338 P.2d at 409.
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which a parolee is subject after his release. If the jury, empowered to select life
imprisonment or capital punishment upon conviction, is told that parole may
decrease any life sentence, perhaps they should also be told that a death penalty
itself can be set aside.8 9 This is not desirable since the very knowledge that
another agency will "oversee" its death verdict may diminish the jury's sense of
responsibility. Nevertheless, it is necessary to balance the parole information,
and such effort need not be carried to a detrimental extreme.
The Prosecutor as Informer
Where the parole information comes to the jury from the prosecutor rather
than from the judge, new considerations arise. Dangers of undue influence over
jurors are high because of the prosecutor's prestige and presumed experience in
the legal area. 90 Clearly a prosecutor's argument urging that the jury inflict the
death penalty rather than risk a parole grant carries great weight. Moreover, his
argument is likely to influence the jury more than the defendant's attorney be-
cause the jury relies on the prosecutor for relatively greater objectivity.9 1 Con-
sider the following examples of prosecutorial references to parole:
"Life imprisonment? Is there any such thing under our system of
parole?" 92
"If you give the defendant a life sentence, his lawyers and some politicians
will get him out of jail and have him walking the streets in a few years." 93
"There is a parole law which turns them out as fast as it gets them there." 94
"I am not criticizing those [parole] laws, they are good in some cases, but
... these Boards do not have the opportunity to pass on the facts of the case
89. See State v. Mosley, 102 N.J.L. 94, 114-15, 131 A. 292, 297 (1925) (dissenting
opinion).
The argument that the death penalty itself can be set aside apparently was used to
justify the affirmance of a conviction in State v. Thorne, 41 Utah 414, 431, 126 P. 286,
293 (1912) (semble): "In any event, the argument of the prosecutor [that the jury
should give the death penalty to preclude the possible release of the defendant if sen-
tenced to life] can be of no avail. If the 'power' to which he referred should feel im-
pelled to turn convicted murderers loose, that 'power' could just as well do so when the
murderer is sentenced to death as it could if he is merely sent to the state prison for
life." The court overlooked the fact that the issue was not what the executive had the
power to do, but what the jury felt the executive might do based upon their knowledge
of the subject. In short, regardless of the existence of the "power," the jury in Thorne
may not have given the death penalty had they not been informed of the possibility that
the defendant could be set free.
90. See 12 TEMP. L.Q. 496 (1938).
91. Note, supra note 76, at 947.
92. Commonwealth v. Crittenton, 326 Pa. 25, 29 n.*, 191 A. 358, 360 n.1 (1937)
(conviction affirmed).
93. McLendon v. State, 205 Ga. 55, 63, 52 S.E.2d 294, 299 (1949) (conviction
affirmed).
94. People v. Murphy, 276 Ill. 304, 323, 114 N.E. 609, 616 (1916) (conviction af-
firmed).
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like you do. So we can eliminate the possibility of later injustice by follow-
ing what the law clearly tells you you have a right to do, and that is to find
the defendant guilty as charged." 95
"[D]on't leave this thing to the whim of some future governor or parole
board .... "96
"Now what does [life imprisonment] mean? It means that after three
years this defendant has a right to ask for a parole by going over with a
sob sister from the interracial commission. ' 97
All of these statements not only convey parole information but also plainly and
effectively urge the jury to act on the information in a particular way. This
persuasion makes it highly possible that the jury will consider parole to the
detriment of the defendant.
In assessing the propriety of parole information being given to the jury, an
appellate court must consider the range of the trial court's discretion. In State v.
Meyer,98 the trial judge himself had instructed the jury concerning parole. On
appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio explained that in its view it was preferable
for the jury to be told, should it inquire, that parole and similar matters are not
issues in the case and, therefore, the jury should not speculate about them. The
court concluded, however, that the trial court in its discretion may explain these
matters to the jury.
If it is the prosecutor's remarks that are in question, trial court discretion
again plays a key role, for the trial judge is in a better position than the appel-
late court to assess the remarks. Whatever the value of this principle in passing
upon other types of forensic misconduct by the prosecutor, the record in the case
of parole arguments would appear well adapted to an appellate determination
of propriety. Unlike an epithet directed at the defendant or a reflection upon
opposing counsel, the propriety and effect of which could depend on tone of
voice, gestures, or other factors not represented in the record, a prosecutor's pa-
role argument is primarily informational and, even when it is graphically or
even sarcastically advanced, the full impact can be gleaned from the record.
What has already been said concerning the undesirability of informing the jury
of parole suggests that the informing is inherently prejudicial and that the man-
ner in which the information is presented to the jury is relevant only to the
intensity of the harm. Fortunately, forensic conduct is not solely within the
discretion of the trial judge but is subject to appellate review.99
95. State v. Henry, 196 La. 217, 258, 198 So. 910, 923 (1940) (conviction reversed
on this ground plus others).
96. State v. Buttry, 199 Wash. 228, 248, 90 P.2d 1026, 1034 (1939) (conviction
affirmed).
97. White v. State, 177 Ga. 115, 125, 169 S.E. 499, 504 (1933) (conviction affirmed).
98. 163 Ohio St. 279, 126 N.E.2d 585 (1955).
99. Note, supra note 76, at 959.
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Defendant's Failure to Object
The failure of the defendant to object (or to seek a ruling or an instruction to
disregard from the trial judge) may bar review. 00 In Lee v. State,10' the jury
sentenced the defendant to death for first-degree murder. The prosecutor had
argued to the jury that a life sentence would render the defendant subject to
parole. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed, noting that
"when that argument was made counsel for the defendant interposed no
objection .. ".. 102 The bar is no mere procedural nicety since the objection at
the trial level allows the judge the opportunity to make a correction. 10 3 Since
the rationale of the objection requirement is to allow for timely correction, it
should not be applied where the error is so serious as to be incorrigible. 10 4 In-
forming the jury of parole is such an error, for once the jury has been told
of parole, nothing the judge says will be sufficient to assure that it will not
consider the information. 0 5
As indicated earlier, 10 6 interruptions during the prosecutor's closing argument
to the jury are not likely to be well received; it is at this stage that jurors are
likely to see objections as calculated to deny them information they should
have. An objection risks the annoyance of the jury'0 7 and emphasizes the very
matter counsel deems objectionable. The parole argument would be especially
difficult to disregard, even upon correction by the judge, when the argument is
forcefully called to the jurors' attention by defense counsel's objection. It is not
surprising that suggestions have been made that little importance be attached to
the failure to object.'0 8 In Sukle v. People'0 9 the jury interrupted its delibera-
tions to inquire of the court whether the defendant, if sentenced to life, would
be eligible for parole. The judge asked counsel if an answer to the inquiry was
100. Bland v. State, 211 Ga. 178, 84 S.E.2d 369 (1954); Anderson v. State, 209 Ala.
36, 95 So. 171 (1922) ; Frady v. People, 96 Colo. 43, 40 P.2d 606 (1934).
101. 265 Ala. 623, 93 So. 2d 757 (1957).
102. Id. at 629, 93 So. 2d at 763.
103. In death cases, courts are likely to be more reluctant to consider the procedural
bar. See State v. Dockery, 238 N.C. 222, 77 S.E.2d 664 (1953). The same may be true
where the case is closely balanced. People v. Sampsell, 34 Cal. 2d 757, 214 P.2d 813,
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 990 (1950).
104. Burnette v. State, 157 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1963) ; State v. Hawley, 229 N.C. 167, 48
S.E.2d 35 (1948) ; State v. Little, 228 N.C. 417, 45 S.E.2d 542 (1947).
105. Eaton v. State, 278 Ala. 224, 177 So. 2d 444 (1965); Wise v. State, 251 Ala.
660, 38 So. 2d 553 (1948). If the defendant does object and is overruled, no correction
of any sort is attempted-indeed, the overruling confirms, in the eyes of the jury, the
propriety of the action objected to. In such a case the appellate court will consider
the asserted error and, if it finds prejudice, reverse the verdict.
106. See p. 318 supra.
107. In People v. Nolan, 126 Cal. App. 623, 14 P.2d 880 (1932), involving an im-
proper remark by the prosecutor, the court recognized this risk yet refused to reverse,
emphasizing the corrective action that might have occurred upon timely objection.
108. Note, supra note 39, at 97.
109. 107 Colo. 269, 111 P.2d 233 (1941).
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appropriate. The response being affirmative, the judge informed the jury that
parole was available to the defendant under a life sentence. The jury returned a
first-degree murder conviction carrying a death sentence. Reviewing the matter
on its own motion, the Supreme Court of Colorado held that the action of the
trial court was improper even with the defense attorney's approval: "[r]efusal
of defendant's counsel to consent to the action of the court, in the circumstances
appearing, would have been fraught with grave peril to his client.""i 0 The
detrimental effect of making objection to parole information introduced by the
prosecutor during summation or provided by the judge upon the jury's request,
together with the fact that the trial judge need not await a defense objection
before intervening,"' weigh heavily against the critical importance some deci-
sions have attached to timely objection.
When the trial court, upon objection or sua sponte, does attempt to correct an
improper reference to parole by an instruction to disregard, the reviewing court
might consider the error cured or non-prejudicial. 1 2 A conviction is more likely
to be affirmed despite an improper parole argument where the instruction clear-
ly and fairly informs the jury." 3 The timing of the court's action may also affect
a determination concerning the sufficiency of the cure and, while courts have
not tended to emphasize this factor, it has been noted as support for affirm-
ance." 4 Immediate correction is better calculated to prevent the jury from form-
ing a lasting misimpression. Nevertheless, where the error consists of exposing
the fact-finder to such volatile information as the operation of parole, no cor-
rection, however strong and however prompt, can remedy the situation. Once
110. Id. at 273, III P.2d at 235.
111. See p. 320 supra.
112. Lee v. State, 265 Ala. 623, 93 So. 2d 757 (1957) ; Pilley v. State, 247 Ala. 523,
25 So. 2d 57 (1946) ; Thackston v. State, 205 Ark. 493, 169 S.W.2d 130 (1943) ; Jones
v. State, 161 Ark. 242, 255 S.W. 876 (1923) ; Frady v. People, 96 Colo. 43, 40 P.2d 606
(1934) ; Brady v. State, 199 Ga. 566, 34 S.E.2d 849 (1945) ; White v. State, 177 Ga. 115,
169 S.E. 499 (1933) ; Manchester v. State, 171 Ga. 121, 155 S.E. 11 (1930) ; State v.
Edwards, 155 La. 305, 99 So. 229 (1923).
113. See Lee v. State, 265 Ala. 623, 93 So. 2d 757 (1957); People v. Lynn, 387 Ill.
549, 56 N.E.2d 808 (1944) ("in strong language") ; Commonwealth v. Earnest, 342 Pa.
544, 21 A.2d 38 (1941).
114. See State v. Thorne, 41 Utah 414, 126 P. 286 (1912) ; Note, supra note 76. In
McLendon v. State, 205 Ga. 55, 52 S.E.2d 294 (1949), however, the court rejected the
appellant's contention that his case differed from past cases in that the trial court had
not acted promptly and positively.
It has been suggested that the point at which the challenged remark itself occurred
might be significant: "Argument by an advocate cannot be treated as an isolated
phenomenon, insulated from all other aspects of the trial. Relatively little attention has
been paid to the significance of the order of argument and the extent to which that
order should be considered by the trial court or in appellate review of challenged per-
suasion." Levin & Levy, supra note 64, at 180-81. See also 15 STAN. L. REv. 349, 355
n.25 (1963). No case has been found, however, where this factor has been given
significant mention by a court reviewing jury consideration of parole.
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learned, that type of information is impossible to "unlearn," and to suppose
that an instruction to disregard will suffice to eliminate the parole knowledge
and the prosecutor's argument from the jury's consideration is common yet
unrealistic.
Accuracy of the Information
Even if informing the jury of parole is not in itself considered reversible error,
a further question concerning the accuracy of the information given may arise.
In People v. Linden,115 the prosecutor, speaking of life imprisonment during
the examination of prospective jurors, referred once to the possibility of parole
"in" seven years. In fact, a sentence of life imprisonment rendered one eligible
for parole only after seven years. The possibility that the jury construed the
prosecutor's language to mean that the defendant, if given a life sentence, could
be paroled well before seven full years of imprisonment did not influence the
Supreme Court of California and the imposition of the death penalty was
affirmed. With respect to this misstatement (and another concerning executive
clemency), the court stated: "The significant matter was that if the jury fixed
the penalty of life imprisonment there were nevertheless means by which de-
fendant could be released from prison; the precise operation of those means was
of no particular importance." 116 The net result of this line of reasoning is that
not only has the jury been informed of the parole possibility, but they also have
been led to believe that the parole law was more lenient than it was in fact.
The extent to which the information was erroneous certainly is relevant in
discussing possible prejudice to the defendant. Had the jury been told that if
sentenced to life the defendant would be eligible for parole in six months, could
the court still have maintained that the "precise operation of those means was of
no particular importance"?
In another case before the California Supreme Court a similar incident oc-
curred. In People v. Sampsell,1l 7 the prosecutor had argued to the jury against
a recommendation of mercy, pointing out that the average prisoner sentenced to
life imprisonment in California served less than seven years. Since the law re-
quired a prisoner to serve at least seven full years of a life sentence before pa-
role could be considered, the true average life term must have been substantially
115. 52 Cal. 2d 1, 338 P.2d 397 (1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 849 (1960).
116. Id. at 25, 338 P.2d at 409. See also People v. Turville, 51 Cal. 2d 620, 335 P.2d
678, cert. denied, 360 U.S. 939 (1959), where the same court affirmed a conviction
despite a parole argument, noting that the prosecutor had correctly stated the law. In
People v. Varnum, 61 Cal. 2d 425, 392 P.2d 961, 38 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1964), vacated, 63
Cal. 2d 629, 408 P.2d 97, 47 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1965), the inaccuracy of the parole in-
formation was considered significant but reversal was based substantially on a different
but related error.
117. 34 Cal. 2d 757, 214 P.2d 813, cert. denied, 339 U.S. 990 (1950).
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higher. Although the court affirmed the conviction, it noted that whether this
was error would depend on the individual case. Linden seems to support the
proposition that a misstatement is no cause for reversal, whereas in Sampsell
the court recognizes that the degree of misstatement can be grounds for rever-
sible error. Of course, some misstatements are negligible, either because their
content errs on a minor point or because the jury must have been aware of the
misstatement. In McLendon v. State,118 the prosecutor stated to the jury: "If
you give the defendant a life sentence, his lawyers and some politicians will get
him out of jail . . .in a few years."11 9 (Emphasis added.) One of the points
urged by the appellant concerned the use of the word "will" rather than "may"
since, under the law, there was no guarantee that the defendant would be re-
leased. In affirming the conviction, the Georgia court considered the prosecu-
tor's remark obviously conjectural; the crux of the matter was not the technical
misstatement nor the degree to which the statement erred, but whether the jury
must have known that even though he used the word "will," the prosecutor was
merely articulating a possibility in persuading the jury not to recommend mercy.
Although the factual or legal assertions contained in a statement to the jury
may be accurate, certain statements might contain "opinions" or suggestions
creating serious misimpressions in the jurors' minds. Where a statement suggests
that the parole provisions in that jurisdiction are not carried out according to
established procedures and criteria, the judgment may be reversed. Statements
to the effect that the parole board can change the rules as often as it desires,
120
that the rules change every day, 121 or that politicians manipulate the parole
board, 122 have resulted in reversals. Courts have, however, affirmed convictions
despite assertions that the jury must either electrocute or free the defendant 123
or that the parole board will act according to whim. 124 These results have been
justified on the ground that the prosecutor was purporting to state only an
opinion on parole possibility rather than matters of objective truth, but this
view fails to appreciate the substance of the statements in question. When such
suggestions have as their source such a prestigious and authoritative figure as
the prosecutor or the judge, what may seem at first blush to be mere argument
becomes a statement of fact as to the actual operation of parole. Consequently,
the jury receives a false impression of that jurisdiction's parole system. Even one
who thinks it desirable for the jury to weigh the possibility of parole can re-
118. 205 Ga. 55, 52 S.E.2d 294 (1949).
119. Id. at 63, 52 S.E.2d at 299.
120. Thompson v. State, 203 Ga. 416, 47 S.E.2d 54 (1948).
121. McCray v. State, 261 Ala. 275, 74 So. 2d 491 (1954).
122. State v. Henry, 196 La. 217, 198 So. 910 (1940).
123. Young v. Commonwealth, 263 Ky. 683, 93 S.W.2d 10 (1936).
124. State v. Buttry, 199 Wash. 228, 90 P.2d 1026 (1939). See also Bryan v. State,
206 Ga. 73, 55 S.E.2d 574, cert. denied, 339 U.S. 904 (1949).
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cognize that such consideration should be made with reference to the actual
parole system to which the defendant will be subjected.' 2 5
A further and equally dangerous false impression which the jury might re-
ceive from a statement concerning the parole possibility is that because of this
post-conviction procedure its own deliberations and verdict are less critical. 126
The reasoning is especially strong where the jury is determining guilt and not
the sentence. Since it can have no function with regard to the penalty-setting, a
parole reference in such a case must amount to a plea to the jury not to be
overly concerned about the verdict since the defendant will actually serve very
little time in prison, and the merits of the case will be reviewed by those who
have the power to release the prisoner.
Clearly, little distinction should be drawn among: (1) a factual or legal mis-
statement concerning parole; (2) a statement which, though not objectively
erroneous, conveys a false impression concerning the ease, capriciousness, or
indifference with which prisoners are paroled; and (3) a reference to parole
calculated to cause the jury to take less seriously the importance of its function.
Prosecutorial Informing in Response to Defense Counsel's Argument
Courts have on occasion looked more kindly upon a parole argument by the
prosecutor if it was in direct or indirect response to a point made by defense
counsel. 127 In State v. Burks,128 a murder conviction with no recommendation
of mercy was affirmed despite the argument by the prosecutor that the
average life term served was not more than ten years. Observing that the
trial judge had correctly instructed the jury as to the law on the subject, the
court added that the statement had been prompted by the defense attorney's
implication that, if sentenced to life, the defendant would actually be incarcer-
ated for life. Any allowances, however, for objectionable statements because
made in retaliation for similar remarks by opposing counsel fail fully to recog-
nize that the criminal law system does not envisage a trial as a contest between
two equals. All of the protections accorded the defendant (many of which are
denied the state) testify to the proposition that the state is committed to more
than pure advocacy. An unfair comment by the defense attorney does not justify
the ensuing objectionable statement by the opponent. As the Supreme Court of
Georgia stated, "[t]wo wrongs do not make a right, and it was the duty of
125. Of course, this system might change before the defendant is eligible for parole.
See p. 310 supra. Informing the jury, however, that the legislature might change the pa-
role law may be more serious than reference to the present parole operation. See People
v. Treloar, 61 Cal. 2d 544, 393 P.2d 698, 39 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1964).
126. See 20 WASH. & LaE L. RFV. 168 (1963) ; Note, supra note 39, at 87.
127. See State v. Jackson, 100 Ariz. 91, 412 P.2d 36, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 877
(1966) ; Anderson v. State, 209 Ala. 36, 95 So. 171 (1922).
128. 196 La. 374, 199 So. 220 (1940) ; accord, Commonwealth v. Crittenton, 326 Pa.
25, 191 A. 358 (1937); State v. Shawen, 40 W. Va. 1, 20 S.E. 873 (1894).
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the solicitor general to object to any improper remark of counsel for the defend-
ant, rather than make one himself in reply."'129 Appellate courts should reject the
provocation argument not only because the defense is allowed more latitude
than the prosecutor in arguing to the jury, 130 but also because the defendant is
entitled to a fair trial notwithstanding his counsel's improper argument."' Con-
cededly, such a policy might encourage the defense intentionally to bait the
prosecutor into improper argument. The remedy for a defense counsel's im-
propriety, however, is not to affirm an unfair conviction but to discipline the
defense counsel according to appropriate procedures of the trial court or of the
bar. 132
The strength of the state's case against the defendant may be an important
factor if the reviewing court deems the parole statement error. If the evidence is
overwhelming or the result appears just, the conviction may be affirmed, the
case's strength being offered as one of the supporting circumstances for the
affirmance. 33 The argument is that since the evidence leads so inevitably to a
conviction, there is little point in requiring a retrial. Such an argument carries
the danger of justifying unfairness because the result is correct. Guilty or not,
the defendant is entitled to a fair resolution of his guilt. Furthermore, the fact
that parole information often affects not only the determination of guilt or
innocence but also the penalty should be emphasized. The weight of the evidence
has no direct bearing on the jury's exercise of its discretion concerning the pen-
alty; the amount of evidence indicates whether to apply a penalty, but not which
penalty to apply. Indeed, it is because the penalty is a matter of discretion that
the potential detriment from a parole statement and the difficulty of assessing
that detriment are so very high.134
Occasionally, appellate courts have refused to reverse a conviction, notwith-
standing error, because of the shocking manner in which the crime was carried
out. The prosecutor in Peterson v. State13 referred to the "mushy parole board"
129. Manchester v. State, 171 Ga. 121, 133, 155 S.E. 11, 17 (1930) (affirmed for
other reasons).
130. People v. Kirkes, 243 P.2d 816, 833, aff'd on rehearing, 39 Cal. 2d 719, 249 P.2d
1 (1952).
131. See Note, supra note 76, at 972.
132. It has been suggested that prejudicial misconduct by the defense attorney might
best be dealt with by granting the state an appeal. In most states, however, double jeop-
ardy interpretations would be a bar. See 34 MicH. L. REV. 1044, 1045 (1936).
133. People v. Linden, 52 Cal. 2d 1, 338 P.2d 397, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 867 (1959)
State v. Thorne, 41 Utah 414, 126 P. 286 (1912); State v. Junkins, 147 Iowa 588, 126
N.W. 689 (1910) ; State v. Kingsley, 137 Ore. 305, 2 P.2d 3 (1931).
134. Pait v. State, 112 So. 2d 380, 385 (Fla. 1959). Yet, that discretion has been used
to approve arguments to the effect that if given a life sentence the defendant may be
pardoned. See Lucas v. State, 146 Ga. 315, 91 S.E. 72 (1916) ; Liska v. State, 115 Ohio
St. 283, 152 N.E. 667 (1926).
135. 231 Ala. 625, 166 So. 20 (1936). See State v. Junkins, 147 Iowa 588, 126 N.W.
689 (1910).
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in an opening statement designed to persuade the jury that the death penalty
was appropriate. Allowing the judgment of conviction to stand, the Alabama
Supreme Court noted the "gruesome" nature of the crime. The dissent pointed
out, however, that whether the crime was gruesome or not, the defendant was
entitled to a fair trial. A similar result was defended with the assertion that,
given the vicious and atrocious circumstances of the crime, the minds of the
jurors could hardly have been further inflamed by anything outside the
record.136
The jury may allow the sordid nature of the crime to affect the guilt deter-
mination; however, such a consideration is improper since the issue is whether
the defendant did or did not commit the crime. To overlook the introduction of
parole information because of the gruesome nature of the crime is to allow both
improper elements to affect the guilt determination. On the other hand, the
shocking nature in which the crime was carried out is normally a proper con-
sideration when levying the penalty. The jury, however, might deem life im-
prisonment an adequate punishment for the most sordid crime. Any considera-
tion of parole information may lead the jury to impose capital punishment,
believing that the defendant will be prematurely released under a life sentence.
That a death penalty is appropriate in such a case is not in question, but the pos-
sibility that the parole information occasioned such a penalty is sufficient reason
for an appellate court to call the penalty into question.
Some effort has been made by reviewing courts, in assessing prejudice, to
determine whether the selection of the penalty was in fact influenced by the pa-
role information. The court might determine that but for the parole argument a
lesser penalty would have been imposed. This conclusion was reached in
Williams v. State,137 where the jury interrupted its deliberations to ask the judge
whether the defendant would have to serve the whole term if sentenced to a
term of years. The judge responded that actual time served would depend on
the defendant's behavior and on the discretion of the parole board. Within five
minutes of this exchange, the jury returned an electrocution verdict. The Su-
preme 'Court of Tennessee reversed since "[e]vidently the jury in the instant
case would have sentenced the defendant to some term in the penitentiary had
they believed that he would have to serve the full term of the sentence."' 38 In
Williams, the nature of the jury's question and the short period of time between
the reply and the verdict made it clear that the information affected the result.
Furthermore, the very fact that the jury discussed parole in its deliberations
may be enough to indicate that the information influenced the penalty. 139 The
136. Lightfoot v. Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 151, 219 S.W.2d 984 (1949).
137. 191 Tenn. 456, 234 S.W.2d 993 (1950).
138. Id. at 459, 234 S.W.2d at 994. See also Sukle v. People, 107 Colo. 269, 111 P.2d
233 (1941) ; Burnette v. State, 157 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1963).
139. Pena v. State, 137 Tex. Crim. 311, 129 S.W.2d 667 (1939).
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same is true when the jury imposes capital punishment, and "the case does not,
in fact, present exaggerating elements calling for such extreme penalty."' 140
Often, the attempt to ascertain the effect of parole information has resulted in
affirmance due to the court's conclusion that, since the jury either returned a
minimum penalty, 141 qualified its verdict to exclude capital punishment, 42 or
sentenced defendant to death, but not his co-defendant, 143 the parole informa-
tion had no effect.
Considering Parole Operation as Common Knowledge
Emphasis has often been placed upon the assertion that operation of parole is
common knowledge, so that parole information from the judge or from the
prosecutor can do no harm. 44 The Supreme Court of Arizona referred to the
parole possibility as a "fact, so well known among all intelligent citizens that it
would almost seem judicial notice might be taken thereof .... ,,145 Such an
argument, which becomes more forceful as the average citizen becomes more
enlightened, 46 overlooks two points. First, even if the average juror is aware of
the operation of parole, it is by no means certain that he will "refer" to that
knowledge during the jury's deliberations. Even if this knowledge was con-
sidered, it would not play as emphatic a role as it would after a specific re-
minder. Second, the parole knowledge jurors have is likely to be vague and
uncertain, and therefore difficult for them to apply to the case at hand. How
different this is from informing them, for example, that the defendant will be
eligible for parole in seven years if given life imprisonment. The Court of Ap-
peals of Kentucky has summed it up: "It is true, we think, that the average
juror does know there is a parole law in Kentucky, but it would be an un-
usual juror who would know the exact number of years a prisoner must serve
before he becomes eligible for parole under a given sentence.' 47
Conclusion
The chief barrier to the resolution of the parole informing problem is probably
the inability to assess both the number of jurors who possess parole operation
140. Augustine v. State, 201 Miss. 277, 291, 28 So. 2d 243, 246 (1946).
141. Thackston v. State, 205 Ark. 493, 169 S.W.2d 130 (1943). See also Jones v.
State, 161 Ark. 242, 255 S.W. 876 (1923) ; Carpenter v. State, 129 Tex. Crim. 397, 87
S.W.2d 731 (1935).
142. State v. Edwards, 155 La. 305, 99 So. 229 (1923).
143. See House v. State, 192 Ark. 476, 92 S.W.2d 868 (1936); Frady v. People, 96
Colo. 43, 40 P.2d 606 (1934); Tate v. Commonwealth, 258 Ky. 685, 80 S.W.2d 817
(1935) ; Grandsinger v. State, 161 Neb. 419, 73 N.W.2d 632 (1955), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 880 (1956); Graham v. State, 202 Tenn. 423, 304 S.W.2d 622 (1957); State v.
Carroll, 52 Wyo. 29, 69 P.2d 542 (1937).
144. People v. Murphy, 276 Ill. 304, 114 N.E. 609 (1916).
145. Sullivan v. State, 47 Ariz. 224, 240, 55 P.2d 312, 318 (1936).
146. See Glenday v. Commonwealth, 255 Ky. 313, 74 S.W.2d 332 (1934).
147. Broyles v. Commonwealth, 267 S.W.2d 73, 76 (Ky. 1954).
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information and the depth of that information. If it could be said with certainty
that all jurors (or no jurors) in a given jurisdiction will be aware of parole be-
fore the trial, how much easier it would be to decide the matter. It would also
be useful to have conclusive information on how jurors might apply whatever
information they bring to the trial or secure from the judge or prosecutor. As a
matter of fact, even after trial, it is not terribly clear how the jury has reacted to
given parole information, 148 and, even if available, that knowledge is of aid only
in appellate review, not in framing a prospective rule of general application to
trials. This lack of predictability, however, does not relieve courts from the ne-
cessity of decisionmaking. Therefore, all possible approaches to the problem
must be asserted in order that rules or guidelines can be formulated.
(1) Allow both the judge and the prosecutor free rein in informing the jury
of parole. This approach is unacceptable. In cases where the jury decides only
the issue of guilt, the information tends to cause a shifting of responsibility to
the parole board by impliedly lessening the importance and finality of the jury
decision. In cases where the jury also has a penalty-setting function, this policy
has the added disadvantage of tending to legitimize any desire on the jury's
part to offset the effects of parole.
(2) Allow only the judge to inform the jury of parole. Under this approach,
the jury would not be subjected to direct persuasion and the parole law would
emanate from a presumably neutral source. Current specific information is
provided, perhaps displacing grossly erroneous notions held by some jurors.
However, it would be desirable for the trial court to caution the jury that the
question of parole is not a matter for them to decide.
(3) Allow only the judge to inform the jury of parole only upon an express
jury inquiry. In such a case, the jury's conclusions will be influenced by some
parole law-real or imagined-and they should have the benefit of the true
state of the law. Furthermore, to refuse to answer a specific question put by the
jury will not eliminate the role of their parole knowledge and may frustrate,
anger or embitter them. In 1958, the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v.
White149 adopted this position despite its acknowledgement that the weight of
authority disfavored informing the jury of parole. Referring to the fact that
most jurors are aware that prisoners sentenced to life are paroled and to the
common misconception that passage of time alone qualifies one for parole, the
court held that a parole instruction should be given the jury in cases where the
148. See State v. Knapp, 194 Wash. 286, 77 P.2d 985 (1938), where, following a
special finding by the jury in favor of the death penalty, the affidavits of two jurors
were submitted asserting that the jury would not have imposed death had they been
assured that life imprisonment would actually be fully served. The Supreme Court of
Washington affirmed, noting that the verdict could not be impeached in that manner
and that it was not for the jury to assess the effects of the prosecutor's remarks.
149. State v. White, 27 N.J. 158, 142 A.2d 65 (1958).
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jury must choose between life imprisonment and the death penalty if, by specific
inquiry, the jury indicates that parole knowledge "is playing a role in the de-
liberations."'' 5 0 The court stressed, however, that the instruction should conclude
with an admonition to exclude parole from their deliberations. The instruction,
decided the court, must be essentially the following:
Any prisoner serving a sentence of life is eligible for consideration
for release on parole after having served 25 years of his sentence, less
commutation time for good behavior and time credits earned and
allowed by reason of diligent application to work assignments. The
statute provides that no prisoner shall be released on parole merely as
a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties assigned
to him, but only if the State Parole Board is of the opinion that there is
reasonable probability that, if such prisoner is released, he will assume
his proper and rightful place in society, without violation of the law,
and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society. A
prisoner released on parole remains on parole for the balance of his
life and if he violates the terms of the parole he may be returned to
prison to serve the life sentence.
I have answered your question, but instruct you that the subject of
possible parole must be excluded from your deliberations. You may
not speculate as to whether parole would or would not be granted. So
far as you are concerned, a life sentence is a life sentence. If upon and
after consideration of all the evidence you believe a recommendation
for imprisonment for life should be made part of your verdict, it
would be a violation of your duty to refuse to make that recommenda-
tion because of the existence in another authority of the power and
responsibility with respect to parole. 151
This lengthy instruction is reproduced in full because of its clarity and balance;
the jury is given the important aspects of the parole law of the jurisdiction, in-
cluding its restrictions, yet the second paragraph makes clear in solemn terms
that the jury is not to be influenced by parole considerations.
(4) Allow neither the judge nor the prosecutor to inform the jury of parole
under any circumstances. 15 2 One problem is that where jurors do in fact have
150. Id. at 178, 142 A.2d at 76. But see Jones v. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 273, 278, 72
S.E.2d 693, 696 (1952): "It seems to us that if it is thought necessary to tell the jury
not to speculate about the information given, it is safer not to give the information at all,
but rather . . . tell the jury that the information they ask is about something not proper
for them to consider."
151. State v. White, 27 N.J. 158, 179, 142 A.2d 65, 76-77 (1958). For the reversal of
a conviction for failure to give a White-type instruction, see State v. Laws, 50 N.J. 159,
233 A.2d 633 (1967). A similar instruction was adopted by the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia in People v. Morse, 60 Cal. 2d 63.1, 388 P.2d 33, 36 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1964).
152. See McGruder v. State, 213 Ga. 259, 98 S.E.2d 564 (1957). In McKuhen v.
State, 216 Ga. 172, 115 S.E.2d 330 (1960), the adoption of this position was completed
in Georgia when, citing McGruder, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the trial
court erred in charging the jury on pardon and parole, even though the charge was
prompted by a question from the jury.
1969]
Catholic University Law Review
some parole knowledge, it might be applied to the case at hand despite any
inaccuracies. To the extent that the knowledge is communicated to others, the
problem is seriously compounded. The great advantage of this position, how-
ever, is that it does not inject the parole issue into the presumably large number
of trials in which jurors do not have any parole knowledge or, if they do, do
not actually call it into use.
(5) Allow only the defendant to decide whether the jury is to be charged by
the judge on the parole law of the jurisdiction. The device of allowing the de-
fendant to decide whether the jury is to be educated concerning parole seems
especially appropriate. There may be situations in which having the choice is of
great value. Considerations such as the nature of the crime, the particular com-
position of the jury, the character of the proof, the personality of the accused,
and the "severity" or "leniency" of the particular parole provisions involved, 153
may indicate to the defendant whether it is to his benefit to have parole informa-
tion officially imported to the jury. Should the defendant initially decide against
any informing, a further option may be desirable if the jury returns from its
deliberations to inquire about parole. That the jury is actively considering pa-
role is a factor which the defendant should be allowed to take into account
when deciding whether the jury is to be formally instructed about parole. To
allow the defendant a choice in the matter seems more just than forcing him to
accept a procedure which he might view as unfair.
Consideration of parole by the jury has received little attention. Very often,
courts called upon to review the question have ruled without providing a suit-
able rationale. More attention is required, and as long as juries have any func-
tion with respect to the penalty the question will be of great importance. It may
be a matter of life and death.
153. The jury might, for example, be more inclined to impose life imprisonment rather
than the death penalty if they are aware that the defendant's recidivism precludes pa-
role. See People v. Linden, 52 Cal. 2d 1, 338 P.2d 397, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 867
(1959) ; People v. Barclay, 40 Cal. 2d 146, 252 P.2d 321 (1953).
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